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From Agency to Zattiero - the Effect of School Board Policy
by John E. Rurnel
Just over two years ago, the Idaho Supreme Court handed
down an opinion which may significantly impact the relationship
between school districts and the various stakeholders-employees,
students and patrons-with whom it interacts and/or serves.
Specifically, in Zattiero v. Homedale School District No. 370,' the
Supreme Court ruled that, because school districts and school
boards are not administrative agencies within the meaning of the
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IAPA,") school board
policies do not have the force and effect of statutory law.-
This article summarizes the Supreme Court's decision in
Zattiero. It points out that the Idaho high court's decision in
Zatiero is both inconsistent with and not compelled by the
Court's prior decisions and is out-of-step with decisions from
other jurisdictions. It discusses how the Court's decision will result
in school districts not having to comply with their own duly-
enacted policies (unless they have otherwise contractually bound
themselves to do so), but will also result in school district patrons
not having to follow school board policy either. The article
concludes by suggesting that, because of the foregoing criticisms
and unintended consequences, the Idaho high court's decision in
Zattiero must be overturned.
I. The Zattiero Decision
Nancy Zatticro was employed as a school nurse in the
Homedale School District for many years. During her
employment with the school district, Zatticro held a certificate as
a school nurse issued by the Idaho State Department of Education.
Since throughout her years of employment, Zattiero performed
nursing duties that could only be performed by a certificated
school nurse, the school district reported Zattiero to the state as a
certificated employee for funding purposes. The district paid all
non-administrative certificated school employees who performed
certificated duties-including counselors and librarians/media
specialists-on the certified salary schedule enacted as part of
school board policy. These facts notwithstanding, the school
district paid Zattiero at a salary somewhere between the lower,
classified/non-certificated salary schedule and the higher, certified
salary schedule.
In late 1998, Zattiero filed a complaint against the school
district, alleging, among other things, that the school district
improperly withheld wages from ler when it failed to pay her
under the terns of the certified salary schedule set forth in board
policy. In mid-July, 2000, Zattiero filed a motion for summary
judgment seeking judgment on both the liability and damage
aspects of her wage claim. Thereafter, the School District filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment seeking judgment of its own.
In late September 2000, the district court denied Zattiero's
motion for summary judgment and granted the school district's
cross-motion, holding that the school district was not required to
compensate Zattiero pursuant to the certified salary schedule set
forth in school board policy.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affliried. In aii opinion
issued in late April, 2002, the Supreme Court, focusing on the fact
that the lowest level on the certified salary schedule grid was for
employees holding a bachelor's degree and that Zattiero possessed
only an associate of arts degree, held that "[w]hile the school board
could pay Zattiero in accordance to the certified schedule, it
was not required to do so either by statute or by school
district policy.''
Although the Court's conclusion that the certified salary
schedule did not cover Zattiero was sufficient to resolve the issue
before it, the Court went on to buttress its holding with anothe;
far more significant determination. Thus, in response to Zattiero's
argument that the certified salary schedule qualified as a local
administrative regulation that had the force and effect of statutory
law, the Court stated as follows:
Zattiero ... correctly points out that policies enacted
by administrative agencies have the force and effect of
statutory law. Ho/ly Care Center v. Staie, Deparment of
_Employment, 110 Idaho 76, 78, 714 P.2d 45, 47 (1986)
(citing Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 690, 604
P.2d 51, 54 (1979)). However, the policies adopted by
the School District do not qualify as statutory rights as
the School District does not qualify as an administrative
agency. Smith v. Meridian Joint School District No. 2, 128
Idaho 714, 721, 918 P2d 583, 590 (1996) (school board
is not an agency within the meaning of the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act (IAPA)). The JAPA
defines an "agency" as "each state board, commission,
department or officer authorized by law to make rules or
to determine contested cases ... " I.C. §67-5201(2). As
noted by this Court in Smith, a school district does not
meet the definitional requirements for an agency because
a school district, once validly organized and in existence,
is a "body corporate and politic" and may sue or be sted,
may acquire, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and may incur debt as provided by law. Smith
at 721, 918 P.2d at 590 (citing I.C. §33-301). Thus,
because the School District is not an agency within the
1APA, the policy set forth in the Certified Schedule does
not have the force and effect of existing law .... 4
The Court denied Zattiero's petition for rehearing in early-
August, 2002.
II. Pre-Zattiero Authority
A. General Principles, Prior Idaho Case Law and Out-of-
State Authorities
Certainly, the Supreme Court held in Smith that, because
school districts and school boards do not fall within the definition
of "agency" under the IAPA, their decisions arc not subject to
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judicial review under that statutory provision. However, the
Court's conclusion does not end the inquiry. In this regard, at least
one well-respected commentator has stated that "an entity can be
an agency for some purposes but not for others, ' and both the
United States Supreme Court and state courts have held that, even
though an entity, including a local school board, may not be
considered an agency for purposes of judicial review under the
relevant federal or state administrative procedures act, that same
entity may be treated as an agency for other purposes, including
reviewing the entity's actions vis- -vis individuals who come
before it.'
Thus, both before and after the Supreme Court's decision in
Smith, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, although not
directly addressing the issue, have repeatedly suggested or assumed
that, with respect to matters other than IAPA review, school
boards, when addressing employment and other policy matters,
act as administrative agencies under Idaho law. For example, in
Roberts ia Board of'Trustees, the Supreme Court treated its review
of a school board's decision discharging a bus driver as the review
of administrative agency action and indicated that the evidence
before an arbitration panel constituted the "agency" record before
the school board. Similarly, in Baker . Independent School District,
the Court referred to a school board meeting to determine possible
nonrenewal of teachers' contracts due to a reduction in force as an
"administrative process" and, further, treated the school board as a
public "agency" for purposes of the Open Meetings Act.' Likewise,
in Knudson v Boundary County School District, the Court of
Appeals held that, in a mandamus proceeding seeking to compel
administrative action, i.e. the re-employment of a teacher, school
board policy regarding evaluations and probation constituted
"administrative" interpretation of statutes., Further, in Bowler .
Board of Trustees, the Supreme Court, although recognizing that a
school board's decision discharging a teacher was not subject to
appellate review under the IAPA, stated that a statement of reasons
requirement in dismissal proceedings did not constitute an undue
"administrative" burden on a school district and school board,"
Also, in Doolittle v. Meridian joint School District the Court, in
case involving a special education student, considered a school
district a "local education 'agencyI" within the meaning of special
education law.' And, in Independent School District of Boise Cit0 v.
C B. Lauch Construction Co., the Court assumed that, when a
school board exercises eminent domain power, it acts as a public
"agency. ''
In addition, a number of courts in other jurisdictions have
agreed that school districts and school boards, when addressing
employment issues, act as or like administrative agencies or
bodies. 3 Likewise, consistent with the Supreme Court's above-
quoted statement regarding the force and effect of administrative
policies generally, a legion of cases and secondary authorities have
recognized the statutory legal status of, and applied statutory rules
of construction to, local school board policy. 4
Given the definition of "agency" set forth in the IAPA, the
Supreme Court correctly held in Smith that a school board is not
an agency for purposes of IAPA jurisdiction and review. However,
the Supreme Court's determination in Zattirro that a school board
is not, for non-IAPA purposes, an administrative agency both
ignores the well-established principle that an entity may be an
agency for some purposes but not for others and runs counter to
over fifty years of the Court's jurisprudence assuming or
suggesting, as well as numerous decisions from other jurisdictions
recognizing, that school boards otherwise have administrative
agency status. As such, the Supreme Court's conclusion that
school board policy does not have the force and effect of statutory
law is founded on an erroneous premise and is at odds with prior
decisions of the Court concerning the force and effect of policies
promulgated by administrative agencies generally, as well as the
decisions of other courts concerning the force and effect of school
board policies specifically.
B. Prior Decisions concerning Non-IAPA Agencies
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Zatiero, the Court
held that the governing bodies of cities and counties, except in the
land use planning context, are not considered agencies under the
IAPA. Notwithstanding those entities' non-IAPA status, the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have repeatedly treated
city and county ordinances like statutes, giving such quasi-
legislative enactments the force and effect of statutory law and
interpreting such enactments consistent with principles of
statutory construction. 6 Like school boards, cities are "bod[ies]
corporate and politic" under state statutory law.'7
The Supreme Court's decision in Zatriero that school boards
are not agencies under the IAPA and, as such, school board policy
does not have the force and effect of statutory law, cannot be
reconciled with the Court's prior decisions concerning other non-
IAPA agencies/bodies corporate and politic. In so holding, the
Court either (1) carved out a "school board" exception to the
general rules that the quasi-legislative enactments of non-IAPA
agencies must be construed consistent with well-settled principles
of statutory construction and have the force and effect of statutory
law, or (2) implicitly overruled its pio holdings concerning the
statutory legal status of quasi-legislative enactments of other, non-
IAPA agencies, such as the governing bodies of cities and counties.
Either way, no principled basis exists for such distinction or
implicit determination.
III. Illogical Reasoning and Unintended Consequences
In addition to running afoul of its prior decisions, the
Supreme Court's decision in Zattiero does not withstand logical
scrutiny. In this regard, the fact that an agency is not subject to
LAPA jurisdiction and review does not remotely lead to the
conclusion that such agencies' actions do not have the force and
effect of statutory law-particularly where both tAPA agencies
and school boards are statutorily empowered to enact rules to
specifically regulate matters within their jurisdiction,9 and where
both IAPA agencies and school boards may only exercise their
authority to engage in rule making or policy making through the
public hearing process. '
Moreover, under the logic of the Supreme Court's decision in
Zatiero, if school board policy does not have the force and effect of
statutory law when a school district employee attempts to require a
school district to comply with its own policy, then school board
policy will not have the force and effect of statutory law when the
school board itself attempts to require a teacher or other school
district employee to comply with its requirement. This unintended
consequence will not significandy impact the school district-
employee relationship because certificated employees and school
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district are mutually bound by school district policy as a matter of
contract law." The same cannot be said, however, for the
relationship between school districts and their patrons-a
relationship where no such contractual relationship exists. Thus,
although city and county rcsidcnts are not free to disregard local
ordinances because such local enactments have the force and effect
of statutory law. under the logic of Zatiero, a school district patron
would not be required to comply with school board policy regarding
such diverse topics as complaint procedures to enrollment policies.
In sum, although the Supreme Court's decision in Zarrero may have
the short-term result of affording school boards more discretion in
addressing personnel matter, it may well result in creating a level of
"lawlessness" in the relation between the school district and its
patrons unforeseen by the Court.
IV. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Zartiero is out of step with
the Court's prior decisions and out-of-stare authority, based on
faulty logic, and, although superficially beneficial to school
districts, will lead to unintended consequences which will not
likely be in the best interest of those local administrative bodies.
For these reasons, Zattiero was not properly decided and should be
overturned by the Court at the first opportunity.
JOHN E. RLMEL is General Counsel for the Idaho Education
Association. Mr Rumel obtained his aw degree trom the University
of California Hastings College of Law in 1981. He served as counsel
for Appellant Zattiero in her unsuccessful appoal to the Idaho
Supreme Court.
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